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Grace at the End of Life: 
Rethinking Ordinary and Extraordinary  
Means in a Global Context 
Conor Kelly 
 
N THE CATHOLIC CONTEXT, health care is a true work of grace. 
The healing, accompaniment, and caring at the heart of health 
care all show the imprint of a God whose love is incarnate in the 
world.1 One essential task for Catholic health care ethics, then, is 
to promote a form of ethical discernment that not only allows people 
to weigh the concrete choices before them but also invites them to be 
attentive to the unfolding of grace in their lives. While every issue in 
contemporary health care is potentially open to this kind of twofold 
analysis, decisions about care at the end of life are especially poignant 
from this point of view because two simultaneous movements of grace 
always need to be held in tension. On the one hand, temporal life needs 
to be recognized and respected as a gift from God. On the other hand, 
the good of eternal life must be acknowledged as an even greater gift 
of grace. 
Traditionally, Catholic health care ethics has used the principle of 
ordinary and extraordinary means to navigate this tension, since the 
distinction ensures that the gift of life is neither dismissed too cava-
lierly nor esteemed too absolutely. In theory, this approach recognizes 
and affirms the work of grace in both the fight to preserve life and the 
willingness to forgo certain treatments, but, in practice, the division 
has been used to suggest that the true path of grace lies only at one end 
of the spectrum. This reduction does serious theological damage both 
speculatively—by preemptively narrowing the space in which one 
conceives of grace at work in the world—and practically—by restrain-
ing ordinary Catholics’ abilities to cooperate with grace in their own 
lives. Furthermore, in an environment of significant global health dis-
parities, this narrowing tendency has the power to exacerbate some of 
today’s worst health-related injustices. Catholic health care ethics 
must respond to this contemporary trend or else it will fail in its service 
to the people of God. The purpose of this article, then, is to analyze 
                                                          
1 For a nice explanation of how grace functions in Catholic health care, see Neil Or-
merod, “Health Care and the Response of the Triune God,” in Incarnate Grace: Per-
spectives on the Ministry of Catholic Health Care, ed. Charles Bouchard (St. Louis: 
CHA USA, 2017), 22–36. 
I 
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the developments reinforcing a narrow view of grace at the end of life 
and to propose solutions that will counteract their force so that Catho-
lic health care ethics might more thoroughly respect the Catholic com-
munity’s faith in the continual prospects of grace at all stages of life. 
In pursuit of this end, the article has three parts. The first part reex-
amines the well-known distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary means, illustrating how both elements of this division originally 
facilitated a proper respect for life as a gift of grace and then explain-
ing how recent trends have transformed the principle into a tool that 
restricts the work of grace all but exclusively to the fight to preserve 
life. Next, the second part of the paper argues that this ballooning of 
the category of ordinary means cannot be justified in a world of dra-
matic health care inequities. In response, part two builds on the grow-
ing scholarly insistence that Catholic health care ethics needs to be in 
closer contact with social ethics, arguing specifically that the line be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary means needs to be interpreted in a 
global and not just a local context. The main result of this reconceptu-
alization is to remove the onus of moral obligation from some of the 
costlier routine procedures whose burden levels seem reasonable in a 
United States context but truly extraordinary when viewed from a 
global perspective. Finally, the third, concluding section of the article 
discusses some of the structural changes that will be necessary to make 
this new approach to ordinary and extraordinary means a more realis-
tic option for more of the faithful today.2 Together, the three parts pre-
sent a challenge to the current approach to end-of-life care while also 
offering a unique set of resources for the church to employ as it seeks 
to support and to encourage the faithful to work in good conscience to 
discern how God is calling them and their family members to respond 
to the complexities of grace at the end of life. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The focus on structural changes stems from the assumption that social structures 
have the power to exert a causal, but not deterministic, effect on moral agents, vari-
ously making certain decisions easier or harder to make. As a result, structural forces 
must be considered when a new approach to moral discernment is countenanced be-
cause the incentives embedded in social structures affect both the likelihood that an 
agent will entertain a new form of discernment (e.g., discern ordinary and extraordi-
nary means in light of a larger social consciousness) and the likelihood that he or she 
will act in a way that is consistent with the results of that discernment. See Daniel K. 
Finn, “What is a Sinful Social Structure?” Theological Studies 77, no. 1 (2016): 136–
164. 
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ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY MEANS AND THE WORK OF 
GRACE 
In Catholic health care ethics, the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary means is a fundamental resource for moral discernment. 
Historically-conscious ethicists note some version of the distinction as 
early as the sixteenth century, and the patron saint of moral theology, 
Alphonsus Liguori, advanced the idea explicitly.3 In its original itera-
tions, the principle of distinguishing ordinary and extraordinary means 
was not about health care per se but about one’s personal moral obli-
gations for self-care more generally.4 Of course, the means in question 
were always means of preserving life, but the context for this reflec-
tion was not bioethics as it is conceived today but something more like 
meta-ethics. In particular, these moralists accepted Thomas Aquinas’s 
assertion that “whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of 
warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law” (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 
2, c). Their main concern was therefore to determine how far one’s 
natural law obligation to preserve his or her own life might extend. 
For example, the sixteenth century Dominican Francisco de Vitoria 
framed the question around “the specific obligation of the human per-
son to eat food and thus sustain life,” asserting that one ought to dis-
tinguish between the positive obligation to attain nourishment and the 
permissible, but not obligatory, effort to secure better quality foods as 
part of that endeavor.5  Other moralists reflected on similar concerns, 
and the eventual conclusion of their debates was that a person only 
had to exhaust his or her energy and resources to procure the ordinary 
means of sustaining human life, including, in the words of Gerald 
Kelly’s twentieth century review of the earlier tradition, “the use of 
reasonably available food, drink, medicines and medical care; the 
wearing of sufficient clothing; the taking of necessary recreation; and 
so forth.”6 One’s natural law obligations did not, however, extend to 
the extraordinary means of preserving life—that is, “everything which 
                                                          
3 James F. Keenan, S.J., “A 400-Year-Old Logic,” Boston College Magazine, Spring 
2005, bcm.bc.edu/issues/spring_2005/ft_endoflife.html#keenan; in “When Burdens 
of Feeding Outweigh Benefits,” Hastings Center Report 16, no. 1 (1986): 30–32, John 
Paris points to the Dominican Domingo Bañez as the originator of the term in 1583. 
Alphonsus Liguori quoted in Scott M. Sullivan, “The Development and Nature of the 
Ordinary/Extraordinary Means Distinction in the Roman Catholic Tradition,” Bioeth-
ics 21, no. 7 (2007): 386–397. 
4 Donald E. Henke, “A History of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means,” in Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration and the Permanently Unconscious Patient: The Catholic De-
bate, ed. Ronald P. Hamel and James J. Walter (Washington, DC: Georgetown Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 53–77. 
5 Henke, “A History of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means,” 55–56. 
6 Gerald Kelly, S.J., “The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life,” Theo-
logical Studies 11, no. 2 (1950): 203–220, 204. 
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involves excessive difficulty by reason of physical pain, repugnance, 
expense, and so forth.”7  
Notably, these extraordinary means involved a number of medical 
treatments, so it is not surprising that the larger idea of distinguishing 
ordinary and extraordinary means of preserving life has become inti-
mately connected with health care ethics today. Indeed, such a devel-
opment is a logical extension of the tradition, since health care is the 
primary field in which humans have to adjudicate various means of 
preserving life. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the roots 
of this distinction go beyond health care to larger matters concerning 
one’s general moral obligation. Significantly, this broader focus on 
moral responsibility, and not just health care decision-making, allows 
one to see the relationship between the classic distinction and the work 
of grace more clearly in two ways. 
First, the distinction presumes grace in its conclusion that certain 
means will be obligatory. The reason there is a duty to preserve life is 
that life is a gift from God. This is a direct conclusion from Aquinas’s 
description of this duty as a universally binding precept of the natural 
law, for he averred as a matter of definition that the “natural law is 
nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal 
law” (ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, c). Insofar as the duty to preserve life was an 
evident principle of the natural law, it was also in alignment with 
God’s eternal law and therefore an affirmation both of God’s role as 
the author of life and, by extension, the giftedness of life itself.8 The 
subsequent specification of this duty through the concept of ordinary 
means begins with this assumption and underscores it, ensuring a 
proper appreciation of the magnanimity of life as a gift of grace. 
Second, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means 
also creates space for grace in the decision to forgo extraordinary 
means of preserving life. The major premise behind this distinction 
was the belief that the preservation of life is a general precept of the 
natural law. Against this background, the novelty of the distinction is 
not that humans would need to use ordinary means to preserve life but 
that some means might actually be extraordinary and for that reason 
not obligatory. Arriving at this conclusion required some alternative—
or at least additional—understanding of grace’s operation at the end 
of life, such that the termination of a gift of grace (i.e., life) might 
nevertheless serve as its own source of (new) grace. As one might im-
agine, Christian faith in the resurrection provided the basis for this in-
terpretation, for hope in the afterlife implies, as David Kelly has put 
                                                          
7 Kelly, “The Duty of Using Artificial Means,” 204. 
8 William May makes this point rather explicitly in Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of 
Human Life, Second Edition (Huntington: Our Sunday Visitor, 2008), 276. 
 Grace at the End of Life 93 
  
it, that “the present life is to be treasured, but it is not all there is.”9 
Such was the clear conclusion of Pope Pius XII in his influential state-
ment on the “Prolongation of Life,” which defended the non-obliga-
tory nature of extraordinary means by arguing that “life, health, all 
temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends.”10 This 
position takes nothing away from the sanctity of life as a gift of grace; 
instead, it adds another level of appreciation for the next life as a won-
derful gift of grace as well. 
For the field of Catholic health care ethics, with its keen interest in 
the work of grace in the world, these two observations point to one 
fundamental reality about the traditional distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means: both sides of this distinction serve to call 
attention to the role of grace amidst serious illness. Consequently, 
Catholic health care ethics should be rightly concerned when the nar-
rative begins to suggest that grace is primarily—or worse, exclu-
sively—found at only one end of the division. Unfortunately, the pop-
ular use of this principle in recent years, at least in the U.S. context, 
has begun to suggest exactly this idea. The clearest way to see this is 
in the interpretation and application of Pope John Paul II’s 2004 allo-
cution on “Life Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State.” 
In that allocution, John Paul II stressed the inherent dignity of the 
human person, criticizing the trend to dehumanize patients in a “per-
sistent vegetative state” on the basis of their reduced functionalities 
and instead emphasizing the intrinsic worth of every human life. In 
order to ensure the protection of life even in this vulnerable state, John 
Paul II addressed the issue of obligatory care for those in a persistent 
vegetative state, and professed, “The administration of water and food, 
even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural 
means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore, 
should be considered, in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as 
such is morally obligatory.”11 Although the language “in principle” 
left some room for discernment in specific cases, the force of this al-
locution was almost immediately evident as moral theologians began 
to debate how authoritatively and definitively a papal allocution could 
assign artificial nutrition and hydration to the category of ordinary 
                                                          
9 David Kelly, Medical Care at the End of Life: A Catholic Perspective (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 5. 
10 Pope Pius XII, “The Prolongation of Life,” in Ronald P. Hamel and James J. Walter, 
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2007), 91–97. 
11 Pope John Paul II, “Address to the Participants in the International Congress on 
‘Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical 
Dilemmas,’” March 20, 2004, w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/ 
2004/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc.html. Emphasis in 
original. 
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means.12 Additionally, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
(CDF) eventually responded to a request for clarification about this 
allocution, further elevating the significance of the teaching and 
prompting renewed discussions about this proposal among those ac-
tively engaged in health care ministry.13 The impact of this papal ad-
dress was especially pronounced in the United States, where it played 
into the ongoing culture war battle over the fate of Terri Schiavo, a 
Florida woman in a persistent vegetative state whose Catholic parents 
were locked in a legal battle with her husband over whether to remove 
her feeding tube.14 As that subtext makes clear, the effect of the allo-
cution was to cement the idea that artificial nutrition and hydration 
ought to be identified prima facie as an ordinary means of preserving 
life, despite the fact that a compelling case can be made for the inter-
pretation that this is precisely not what the allocution meant in practi-
cal terms.15 Whatever the authoritative status of the allocution and its 
interpretation, the prima facie reading certainly had a lot of influence, 
particularly in the context of Schiavo’s case and its aftermath. This 
                                                          
12 For one illustration of this debate, see Thomas A. Shannon and James J. Walter, 
“Assisted Nutrition and Hydration and the Catholic Tradition,” Theological Studies 
66, no. 3 (2005): 651–662; John J. Paris, James F. Keenan, and Kenneth R. Himes, 
“Quaestio Disputata: Did John Paul II’s Allocution on Life-Sustaining Treatments 
Revise Tradition?” Theological Studies 67, no. 1 (2006): 163–168; Thomas A. Shan-
non and James J. Walter, “A Reply to Professors Paris, Keenan, and Himes,” Theo-
logical Studies 67, no. 1 (2006): 169–174. See also Kevin O’Rourke, “Reflections on 
the Papal Allocution Concerning Care for Persistent Vegetative State Patients,” Chris-
tian Bioethics 12, no. 1 (2006): 83–97. For a thorough account of how this debated 
question was treated before the papal allocution, see Michael R. Panicola, “Withdraw-
ing Nutrition and Hydration,” Health Progress 82, no. 6 (2001): 28–33. 
13 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Responses to Certain Questions of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration,” September 16, 2007, www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congrega-
tions/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070801_risposte-usa_en.html; Congre-
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Commentary on Responses to Questions Pre-
sented by His Excellency the Most Reverend William S. Skylstad,” August 1, 2007, 
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith 
_doc_20070801_nota-commento_en.html. See also Ron Hamel, “The CDF Statement 
on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: What Should We Make of It?,” Health Care 
Ethics USA 15, no. 4 (2007): 5–7; Kevin D. O’Rourke and John J. Hardt, “Nutrition 
and Hydration: The CDF Response, in Perspective,” Health Progress 88, no. 6 (2007): 
44–47; Justin F. Rigali and William E. Lori, “On Basic Care for Patients in the ‘Veg-
etative State:’ A Response to Dr. Hardt and Fr. O’Rourke,” Health Progress 89, no. 
3 (2008): 70–72. 
14 For an overview of the way this case unfolded in the culture wars, see Cathleen 
Kaveny, Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 65–74. 
15 James T. Bretzke, “A Burden of Means: Interpreting Recent Catholic Magisterial 
Teaching on End-of-Life Issues,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 26, no. 2 
(2006): 183–200. 
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result is especially troubling because, as the debate over Schiavo’s 
case illustrates, an abstract determination of a particular treatment as 
an ordinary means restricts the work of grace to the attempt to prolong 
temporal life. 
Admittedly, few of the people discussing Schiavo’s case appealed 
to the work of grace, but the public discourse from Catholic leaders at 
the time reveals implicit assumptions about the place of grace at the 
end of life. The best example is a statement from Archbishop Charles 
Chaput, then head of the Archdiocese of Denver, who condemned the 
removal of Schiavo’s feeding tube as “a form of murder…[that] at-
tack[s] the sanctity of human life…[and] reject[s] any redemptive 
meaning to suffering.”16 By appealing to the affront to the sanctity of 
human life, Chaput’s statement implied that the grace of life was not 
appropriately recognized and honored in Schiavo’s case. At the same 
time, by lamenting the dismissal of suffering’s redemptive meaning, 
his statement also suggested that the removal of Schiavo’s feeding 
tube was a missed opportunity for grace, leaving one to infer that the 
real place to search for grace at the end of life is in the divine assis-
tance necessary to persevere in the face of exceptionally challenging 
medical conditions, no matter how debilitating. Other Catholic lead-
ers, including Cardinal Renato Martino, the head of the Pontifical 
Council for Justice and Peace at the time, made similarly strong state-
ments.17 
Of course, there are a number of unique issues in Schiavo’s case, 
and the discussion here is not meant to gloss over the complexities 
involved, but it is important to appeal to this example nonetheless be-
cause the very public debate about Schiavo’s treatment ensured that a 
certain interpretation of Catholic teaching on end-of-life care managed 
to shape the narrative of the day.18 Reflecting on the case and the larger 
duty to preserve life, the senior ethicist for the Catholic Health Asso-
ciation at the time, Ron Hamel, noted that 
 
Two standards for making decisions about nutrition and hydration 
have emerged and now exist side by side. One is a more holistic stand-
ard based on the traditional teaching, in which benefits and burdens 
                                                          
16 Charles J. Chaput, “Statement by Archbishop Chaput on Terri Schiavo,” Catholic 
News Agency, March 22, 2005, www.catholicnewsagency.com/document/statement-
by-archbishop-chaput-on-terri-schiavo-252. 
17 Renato R. Martino, “Statement of Cardinal Renato Martino on Behalf of Terri 
Schiavo,” Catholic Culture, March 7, 2005, www.catholicculture.org/culture/li-
brary/view.cfm?recnum=6374. 
18 Kaveny makes the point that the contributions of leading Catholics to the popular 
debate were mainly in the form of prophetic rhetoric and as such presumed that their 
interpretation of the moral obligations in the case was the only possible interpretation 
that could be sustained by people who shared their same religious and moral commit-
ments, see Kaveny, Prophecy without Contempt, 71–72. 
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are understood broadly relative to the person, and any means of pre-
serving life is subject to a benefit-burden analysis. The other is a more 
restrictive standard based on recent revisions of the traditional teach-
ing, in which benefits and burdens are understood narrowly, apart 
from relative factors, and nutrition and hydration are given a special 
moral classification.19 
 
Although Hamel demurred on which of these two standards was tak-
ing hold (notably, he wrote while Schiavo’s case was still unfolding), 
Thomas Shannon and James Walter were more insistent after witness-
ing the concerted Catholic response to Schiavo’s situation, offering, 
“we remain persuaded that there is…a shift to deontological reasoning 
in the area of death and dying, complemented by categorizing inter-
ventions as ordinary or extraordinary [in isolation].”20 They pointed 
directly to John Paul II’s 2004 allocution as the tipping point. 
There is much to suggest that Shannon and Walter are right: there 
has been a shift toward deontological thinking in the approach to death 
and dying. On the one hand, there were a number of cultural factors 
that encouraged this shift, most notably concerns about the contempo-
raneous movement seeking to legalize euthanasia and physician as-
sisted suicide.21 Against this background, the impulse is certainly un-
derstandable. On the other hand, there are real costs to this develop-
ment. The greatest cost is in the growing assumption among ordinary 
Catholics that they must do everything in their power to fight death 
for themselves and their loved ones or else they risk turning into un-
conscious pawns in the culture of death, actively involved in violating 
the sanctity of human life as a gift from God. However dramatic this 
may sound, personal anecdotal evidence reveals there are people fac-
ing these sorts of end-of-life decisions who earnestly feel this way. 
Often, many of them are led to this conclusion by their well-meaning 
parish priests who have followed the public battles over end-of-life 
care for Catholics but have not had the opportunity to delve into the 
particulars of the church’s long tradition.22 
                                                          
19 Ronald Hamel, “Must We Preserve Life?,” America, April 19, 2004, www.ameri-
camagazine.org/issue/482/article/must-we-preserve-life. 
20 Shannon and Walter, “A Reply,” 173. 
21 See Michael D. Place, “Thoughts on the Papal Allocution,” Health Progress 85, no. 
4 (2004): 6, 60. 
22 In recognition of precisely this challenge, Catholic Health Association USA has 
launched a series of workshops for clergy to familiarize them with the details of the 
church’s position on end-of-life care. One part of the workshop is dedicated to “dis-
pelling myths,” specifically the “misconception that the Catholic Church requires 
Catholics to say yes to all medical interventions.” Julie Minda, “Clergy Gain Insights 
on Assisting in End-of-Life Care Choices,” Catholic Health World, May 15, 2018, 
www.chausa.org/publications/catholic-health-world/archives/issues/may-15-
2018/clergy-gain-insights-on-assisting-in-end-of-life-care-choices. 
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If all this led to merely a presumption in favor of something like 
artificial nutrition and hydration—which the USCCB’s Ethical and 
Religious Directives (ERDs) affirms—then one might be tempted to 
say no harm, no foul.23 The problem, however, is that this logic is not 
restricted to artificial nutrition and hydration but is instead applied to 
interventions more broadly. People begin to think that the only way to 
cooperate with grace at the end of life is to fight for life and to hope 
for the grace to persevere through suffering in that fight.  
Of course, this is not to say that people only come to this conclu-
sion as a result of Catholic involvement in the culture wars. There are 
other cultural influences at work, especially the “idolatry of health” 
and the growing assumption that the purpose of modern medicine is 
to eliminate suffering and, ideally, counteract the effects of mortal-
ity.24 The net effect of these developments, though, is that questions 
of the proportionate and disproportionate nature of certain means have 
begun to disappear, except for the most well-informed patient, and 
Catholics have instead defaulted in favor of intervention. Given the 
history of the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means, this is a 
theological problem because of what it says about our appreciation of 
grace, and it is also a pastoral problem for the stress it adds to families 
at an especially trying time. Just as importantly, this change is also a 
theological problem because of what it does to the distribution of 
scarce medical resources. 
 
THE EXTRAORDINARY NATURE OF ORDINARY MEANS IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 
The narrowing of options for faithful Catholics and the implicit re-
striction of grace to the active fight to preserve life presents poignant 
problems in light of contemporary health care disparities. As the phy-
sician and reformer Paul Farmer is quick to point out, the story of 
medicine in the contemporary world is a story of radical disparities, 
all of which revolve around one feature: poverty. “Surveys have 
shown,” Farmer notes in an article with his colleague Nicole Gasti-
neau Campos, “that in the world’s poorest countries, the affluent have 
ready access to [expensive modern medical treatments like]…an-
tiretroviral agents…therapy for renal insufficiency…[and] NICUs…. 
At the same time, the world’s poor, even those living in wealthy na-
tions, do not have reliable access to good medical care or to the fruits 
                                                          
23 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, 2009), no. 58; cf. Shannon and Walter, “A Reply,” 172. 
24 George Khushf, “Illness, the Problem of Evil, and the Analogical Structure of Heal-
ing: On the Difference Christianity Makes in Bioethics,” Christian Bioethics 1, no. 1 
(1995): 102–120; Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the 
Problem of Suffering (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 101. 
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of medical science.”25 This truth is readily apparent to anyone who has 
seen understaffed inner-city trauma centers in the United States or who 
has traveled abroad to oppressed areas of the global south.  
Nevertheless, Catholic health care ethics has not grappled with this 
reality effectively. As Daniel Daly observed in his own work contex-
tualizing the ethics of end-of-life care in a world of radical health in-
equities, “While the suffering and premature death that is common-
place in the global south has emerged as a central topic within Catholic 
medical ethics, few moral conclusions have changed as a result. The 
diminished and shortened lives of the global poor are lamented but 
have not concretely altered moral analysis or conclusions.”26 Un-
doubtedly, this reality is something that end-of-life ethics needs to take 
more seriously, and the application of the principle of ordinary and 
extraordinary means should not be immune to this global reality. 
To give a quick sense of the problem in more concrete terms, con-
sider just a few sobering statistics. Less than a decade ago, the World 
Health Organization reported that OECD countries consumed 86 per-
cent of all health dollars spent globally while encompassing only 18 
percent of the population.27 Unsurprisingly, this translates into signif-
icant disparities in access to health care services, and the WHO esti-
mates that even today “at least half of the world’s population cannot 
obtain essential health services.”28 A number of examples reveal very 
clearly that this half of the world’s population is defined by poverty 
and, by extension, geography since truly abject poverty is concen-
trated in the so-called developing nations of the global south. First, a 
2010 review of trends in maternal mortality found that 99% of all 
women who died from complications related to their pregnancy lived 
in developing nations.29 Second, the leading cause of “lost life years” 
(i.e., early death) in the global north and BRICS nations (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and South Africa) is almost universally heart disease, 
a tricky medical problem to address. The leading cause of lost life 
                                                          
25 Paul Farmer and Nicole Gastineau Campos, “Rethinking Medical Ethics: A View 
from Below,” Developing World Bioethics 4, no. 1 (2004): 17–41. 
26 Daniel J. Daly, “Unreasonable Means: Proposing a New Category for Catholic End-
of-Life Ethics,” Christian Bioethics 19, no. 1 (2013): 46. 
27 World Health Organization, The World Health Report: Health Systems Financing: 
The Path to Universal Coverage (Geneva: WHO Press, 2010), 4. Available online at 
www.who.int/whr/2010/en/. 
28 World Health Organization, “World Bank and WHO: Half the World Lacks Access 
to Essential Health Services, 100 Million Still Pushed into Extreme Poverty because 
of Health Expenses,” December 13, 2017, www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/13-12-
2017-world-bank-and-who-half-the-world-lacks-access-to-essential-health-services-
100-million-still-pushed-into-extreme-poverty-because-of-health-expenses. 
29 World Health Organization, Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990 to 2010 (Geneva: 
WHO Press, 2012), 22. Available online at apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/han-
dle/10665/44874/9789241503631_eng.pdf?sequence=1. 
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years in the global south, however, runs the gamut from HIV/AIDS 
(similarly tricky to tackle, yet with a clearer management plan than 
heart disease) to malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia-type illnesses, 
which have much less costly solutions.30 Third, as Paul Farmer help-
fully illustrated in the midst of the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak, most 
health care disparities today come down to the distribution of “staff, 
space, stuff, and systems.” The varying availability (or unavailability) 
of these four things explains why Ebola mortality rates hovered at 75% 
in Western African nations but plateaued at 25% in Germany during a 
rare outbreak there nearly half a century earlier.31 This gets to the 
heart of the problem, revealing that global health care disparities are 
chiefly about access to care and that the worst of these disparities re-
flects the lack of access to even basic medical care that the WHO has 
ascribed to at least one half of the world’s population. 
In a world where the majority of people cannot reliably hope to 
receive everyday health care treatments like vaccines, prenatal moni-
toring, and safe drinking water, surely one has to reconsider what con-
stitutes an ordinary means of preserving life. Admittedly, this is not 
an easy thing to do. The traditional approach to ordinary and extraor-
dinary means has presumed that these categories need to accommo-
date local variation, since the means in question have to be available 
to a given patient in his or her particular situation.32 The CDF’s initial 
interpretation of John Paul II’s allocution follows this logic in assert-
ing a permissible exception to the obligation to provide artificial nu-
trition and hydration “in very remote places or in situations of extreme 
poverty…[where] the artificial provision of food and water may be 
physically impossible.”33 The prevailing norm, however, is that treat-
ments normally accessible in one part of the world ought to be identi-
fied as ordinary means—and thus obligatory interventions, all things 
being equal—for all patients in the same locale, except when medical 
futility arises in particular cases. There are good reasons for this norm 
because it militates against disparate treatment of similar patients in 
the same context and bolsters the argument for providing an equally 
rigorous standard of care to all patients as a matter of justice.  
Unfortunately, this approach also masks and exacerbates global 
health inequities because it encourages people to take a local view of 
their place in an increasingly interconnected health care infrastructure. 
                                                          
30 Dylan Matthews, “The #1 Reason People Die Early, in Each Country,” Vox, March 
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31 Jonathan Hiskes, “Stopping Infectious Disease Requires ‘Staff, Space, Stuff, and 
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32 Pope Pius XII, “The Prolongation of Life,” 94. 
33 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Commentary.” 
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When people evaluate the benefits and burdens of a proposed treat-
ment in the narrow context of their place in the United States, for in-
stance, they can quickly overlook the fact that this treatment might be 
very costly, contributing to the disproportionate use of health care re-
sources in the global north and thereby undermining the expansion of 
access to basic care in the global south. Granted, this is not strictly the 
result of a direct causal chain, although in a globalized world with fi-
nite health care resources, overuse by some still does result in un-
deruse by others. The strongest impact arises from the creation of mis-
aligned incentives, such as the way that the rich health care markets of 
the global north prompt a “brain drain” from the global south as 
trained medical professionals seek higher paying jobs and better work-
ing conditions in wealthier countries, creating shortages of health care 
workers in their homelands.34 In light of these challenges, it is neces-
sary to encourage a greater sense of (global) solidarity in the ethical 
discernment surrounding end-of-life care. 
Of course, this is not exactly a novel suggestion. In the early 2000s, 
Lisa Sowle Cahill made the case for a theological approach to health 
care ethics that would distinguish itself, in part, from its secular coun-
terparts by its explicit emphasis on evaluating bioethics as a social 
ethics issue.35 One of the ways she illustrated this approach was with 
a powerful critique of the tendency to use a concern for the vulnerable 
as an excuse to ignore the impact of end-of-life care on the common 
good. Pointing toward the implications of a more globally-conscious 
perspective, Cahill argued that “specific allocations of health care re-
sources need to be made…in awareness of the need for redistributive 
justice in meeting basic needs of persons in less advantaged societies 
before providing relatively expensive or exotic life-prolonging tech-
nologies to those in more privileged circumstances.”36 The present ef-
fort to reexamine ordinary and extraordinary means adds specificity to 
some of Cahill’s critiques and extends her concerns, many of which 
have only been amplified by the global rise in inequality that has been 
                                                          
34 Daly, “Unreasonable Means,” 48. This can also be seen in the way that the outsized 
scope of the U.S. drug market orients research and development toward the inconven-
iences of an aging population (e.g., erectile dysfunction) and away from the life-
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35 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, Change (Wash-
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 1–3. 
36 Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 110. 
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a defining feature of the last thirteen years since her book was pub-
lished.37 
While Cahill set the stage, in many ways, for a more globally con-
scious approach to health care ethics in general, another theological 
ethicist has followed her lead to address end-of-life care specifically 
from the perspective of social ethics. Writing with an acute awareness 
of global health disparities, the aforementioned Daniel Daly proposed 
a solution to the disproportionate use of health care resources for end-
of-life care in developed countries by championing the addition of a 
new category to the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means that 
would create “an upper moral limit on medical treatment at the end of 
life.”38 His concept of “unreasonable means” (a term borrowed from 
David Kelly) prohibits the use of treatments “when the burdens to the 
patient and community far outpace the benefits to the patient…and 
when [their] use…directly or indirectly limits another patient’s access 
to ordinary means.”39 This is an important development that goes a 
long way in addressing the myopia that the culturally variable account 
of ordinary and extraordinary means promotes. It highlights the inter-
related nature of health care decisions in a world of finite health care 
resources, and it invites the cultivation of solidarity as a patient or a 
patient’s family begins to consider personal medical decisions in rela-
tion to the common good. Precisely for these reasons, Daly’s solution 
serves an essential function in contemporary health care ethics, and it 
represents a necessary addition to Catholic end-of-life ethics in partic-
ular. However necessary, though, Daly’s category of unreasonable 
means is not sufficient alone. Given the recent developments in as-
sumptions regarding the principle of ordinary and extraordinary 
means, the problem of inordinate uses of health care resources cannot 
be solved solely by adding to the distinction in order to expand its 
force. Instead, the distinction itself needs reevaluation. 
The solution proposed here, then, is to take Daly’s instincts and 
apply them to the other end of the spectrum of care. Daly offers a ter-
minus at one end by arguing that unreasonable means are morally pro-
hibited. This leaves ordinary means as the morally obligatory way to 
prolong life and extraordinary means as the morally supererogatory 
(i.e., optional) way to prolong life. If one considers things in these 
terms, it is easy to see how the distinction itself contributes to the prob-
lem, especially when the category of ordinary means begins to balloon 
to encompass more interventions less critically. To be more precise, 
the rapid expansion of the category of ordinary means has facilitated 
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38 Daly, “Unreasonable Means,” 52. 
39 Daly, “Unreasonable Means,” 52–53. 
102 Conor Kelly  
 
 
broader trends, like the medicalization of human health and the ex-
panding vision of medicine’s proper purpose, which lead to the dis-
proportionate use of health care resources in developed nations like 
the United States, because the category tells Catholics that they must 
use certain treatment options at the end of life. Given that end-of-life 
care is one of the most expensive categories of care, this perspective 
certainly has the potential to exacerbate the current global health in-
equities.40 In response, Catholic health care ethics needs to find a way 
to give greater latitude to the interpretation of ordinary means, thereby 
counteracting the implicit narrowing of the space for grace in end-of-
life care that has accompanied the rise of deontological thinking in the 
application of the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means. 
In concrete terms, this solution entails an expansion of the factors 
that ought to be evaluated when one employs the principle of ordinary 
and extraordinary means to discern appropriate end-of-life care. Cur-
rently, “places, times, and culture” are a factor in the determination of 
ordinary means, and this is quite appropriate for the reasons outlined 
above. Yet, in a world of global health care disparities, it is not enough 
to see the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means in a 
local context alone. As a matter of solidarity, which involves “a firm 
and persevering commitment to the common good; that is to say to the 
good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsi-
ble for all” (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, no. 38), Catholics ought also to 
consider the ways that access to care affects the determination of or-
dinary means. More specifically, they need to account for the fact that 
what is ordinary in a U.S. context might be deemed quite extraordinary 
in much of the rest of the world. The best way to do this is to discern 
the burdens of a proposed treatment not simply in one’s immediate 
circumstances but also according to a broader global perspective. 
Something along these lines is already presumed in the work of 
discerning ordinary and extraordinary means, for as the ERDs sum-
marize that long tradition, ordinary means “are those that in the judg-
ment of the patient offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail 
an excessive burden or impose excessive expense on the family or the 
community.”41 By highlighting the need to consider not simply the 
burdens to the patient himself or herself but also to the larger circles 
of family and community, the ERDs present the principle of ordinary 
                                                          
40 Studies of the U.S. Medicare system indicate that nearly one-third of all Medicare 
expenditures go to the five percent of patients who die in a given year. Amber E. 
Barnato, Mark B. McClellan, Christopher R. Kagay, and Alan M. Garber, “Trends in 
Inpatient Treatment Intensity among Beneficiaries at the End of Life,” Health Ser-
vices Research 39, no. 2 (2004): 364. 
41 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives, 
no. 56. 
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and extraordinary means as a potential tool of solidarity insofar as it 
invites the patient to see herself or himself as a person in relationship 
with others whose wellbeing is also a concern. The challenge, though, 
is that this broader sense of burden is often hard to gauge, especially 
since each person is a constituent of multiple communities. The point 
of this proposal, then, is to invite patients to recognize themselves as 
members of the global community and to encourage them to account 
for the burdens their treatment(s) might impose on that community as 
well. Given the disproportionate use of health care resources by the 
global north and the misaligned incentives that this reality creates, pa-
tients in a U.S. context should address their global accountability by 
assessing the extent to which a proposed treatment reinforces interna-
tional disparities by using resources to provide a form of care in the 
global north that is inaccessible to the majority of the population in the 
global south. 
In practical terms, one can envision this type of discernment as a 
twofold process. First, a patient would evaluate the benefits and bur-
dens of a treatment according to her or his immediate circumstances. 
Then, the patient would try to imagine how he or she would evaluate 
the benefits and burdens of the same treatment if he or she were in 
another part of the world, like the global south, focusing on the addi-
tional burdens and new obstacles that might stand in the way of treat-
ment when one can no longer count on the advantages of a well-estab-
lished health care system. In many instances, this twofold process 
would likely generate some degree of dissonance, for the unjust dis-
tribution of health care resources, which results in lower standards of 
care in the global south, could very well lead to the conclusion that 
what a patient discerns as an ordinary treatment in the United States is 
deemed extraordinary by the majority of the world’s population. The 
obvious question is what a patient ought to do with this dissonance, 
and this is where the Catholic moral tradition’s insistence that the de-
termination of an ordinary or extraordinary means can only occur in 
the concrete situation of a patient’s particular course of treatment be-
comes especially important, for it indicates that the resolution of this 
dissonance is a matter of conscience.42 While this may seem flippant 
or dismissive, it is not. As “the most secret core and sanctuary of a 
[human person where one]…is alone with God, Whose voice echoes 
in his [or her] depths” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 16), conscience is pre-
cisely where this decision should take place, for the final determina-
tion of whether one’s end-of-life care represents an ordinary or ex-
traordinary means comes down to discerning how one is called to co-
operate with God’s grace.  
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While the ultimate decision remains a matter of conscience, which 
always operates in the concrete and cannot be predetermined,43 atten-
tion to the work of grace at the end of life suggests that certain out-
comes might be more common than others. Specifically, one can im-
agine that in most cases the twofold discernment process would still 
lead patients to accept treatment as an ordinary means according to 
their local context. This is because adequate respect for the sanctity of 
life as a gift of grace justifies deference to a more expansive definition 
of ordinary means, which is typically going to arise from the local ra-
ther than the global analysis. Even in these instances, though, it will 
still be helpful for patients to have examined their decision from a 
global perspective, for this can promote an appropriate sense of global 
awareness that better enables one to appreciate both the fragility of life 
as a gift of grace and the privilege of cooperating with grace in its 
preservation. In some unique cases, though, the disconnect between 
local and global understandings of ordinary means might prompt a 
particular patient to forgo a treatment that he or she initial discerned 
to be an ordinary means of prolonging life in his or her locale, as long 
he or she did so under narrow circumstances and for the right reasons. 
This, of course, is where the greatest impact of this twofold discern-
ment process comes to light, for it represents a departure from the typ-
ical assumptions surrounding the principle of ordinary and extraordi-
nary means. Currently, the local decision is the one that creates the 
force of moral obligation, for that which a patient discerns to be an 
ordinary means according to his or her time, place, and culture must, 
for that very reason, be used to prolong the patient’s life. With the 
addition of a global perspective, however, the obligation can give way 
to a concern for global justice, which is consistent with both the Chris-
tian understanding of the practical implications of faith in Jesus Christ 
as the Son of God and, as outlined below, the belief that God’s grace 
is at work in the world, even at the end of life.44 
Before addressing the opportunities for grace inherent in this new 
approach to ordinary and extraordinary means, it seems prudent to of-
fer a bit more detail about the unique areas where a patient’s judgment 
of conscience might prompt them to defer to the discernment of ex-
traordinary means according to the global rather than local perspec-
tive. While it is tempting to try to articulate a set of criteria that would 
restrict this situation in advance, such an approach would merely per-
petuate some of the problems that have given rise to the need for a 
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Christian faith, see Lisa Sowle Cahill, Global Justice, Christology, and Christian Eth-
ics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 Grace at the End of Life 105 
  
new interpretation of ordinary and extraordinary means in the first 
place. After all, the twofold process proposed here is designed, in part, 
to counteract the tendency to view ordinary means as a deontological 
category. Fortunately, the well-established tradition of moral discern-
ment through casuistry offers a way to develop some additional spec-
ificity without devolving into a deontological calculus. Consider, then, 
the case of patients in a persistent vegetative state, which is, of course, 
the question that has been at the heart of the very deontological shift 
that needs more critical evaluation. 
In this case, the twofold discernment process articulated above en-
tails that a Catholic could, in good conscience, instruct his or her 
health care proxy to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration if he 
or she were diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state (and had been in 
that state for a sufficiently prolonged period virtually to eliminate the 
possibility of eventual recovery). In this situation, the Catholic in 
question would need to settle on these instructions not out of a fear of 
being stuck in this life in this condition but out of a desire to avoid 
excessively taxing the health care system in a way that perpetuates the 
disproportionate use of medical resources in the global north (as a 
whole) and encourages the persistence of the global health care sys-
tem’s perverse incentives. In a word, this would have to be a selfless 
decision, motivated by the recognition that in many—in fact, most—
parts of the world this diagnosis would be an almost immediate death 
sentence because even the relatively rudimentary care of continual 
nursing and artificial nutrition and hydration is inaccessible. Out of 
solidarity with the majority of the population in this situation and out 
of a desire to combat the very inequities that make this lack of access 
a reality, one in this context could opt out of the active interventions 
of the modern health care system and instead ask for hospice care so 
that there might be additional resources available for more basic (or 
perhaps similarly basic) care for more people in the world. Granted, 
the act would likely be one of prophetic resistance to a large-scale 
structural problem rather than a direct solution to it, but the example 
of Jesus clearly shows that there is value—and more importantly, 
grace—in these kinds of actions. While this discernment might seem 
to contradict the official magisterial interpretation of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration, observers who are attuned to the intricacies of 
magisterial authority and papal pronouncements note that the Magis-
terium’s “official” position on artificial nutrition and hydration (even 
for patients in a persistent vegetative state) is not so clear cut.45 Con-
sequently, the effect of the twofold discernment process advocated 
here is not to contradict magisterial teaching but to nuance its inter-
pretation and application, so that an isolated reading of one papal ad-
dress does not undercut the Catholic community’s fidelity to its core 
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convictions like hope for the resurrection or a commitment to the pref-
erential option for the poor.  
Naturally, there are likely to be concerns with an approach like this, 
especially since one of the factors motivating the shift toward a deon-
tological interpretation of ordinary and extraordinary means was a de-
sire to protect life at all of its vulnerable stages. While this is a laudable 
goal, it is important to recognize that expanding the notion of ordinary 
means in a prima facie fashion does not serve this end directly. Cer-
tainly, as suggested above, a tendency to categorize a specific medical 
treatment as an ordinary means of prolonging life can aid the effort to 
insist that every patient should, as a matter of justice, have access to 
that treatment, but the notion of ordinary means does not directly en-
tail this conclusion. The real moral implication of defining something 
as an ordinary means is not that everyone should have access to this 
means of preserving life but that anyone who does have access must 
use it. On its own, the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means 
is not about access to care, which is why patients and their families 
need to be encouraged to incorporate a broader perspective when they 
apply this principle. The global perspective presented here as part of a 
twofold discernment process does this by creating more space for the 
exercise of conscience in the adjudication of ordinary means. Thus, 
the notion of a broader process that compares local determinations 
with global realities prompts a question of justice and might lead to 
different choices, which, collectively, could have the power to undo 
some of the injustices plaguing health care today. Of course, this ap-
peal to conscience carries risks of relativism alongside the risk that a 
patient or his or her family might make a morally bad decision, but 
such is the nature of conscience in fallible human beings. The Catholic 
community ought to be willing to accept these risks in order to honor 
the high dignity of conscience. Furthermore, the Catholic community 
ought to tolerate these risks out of a respect for the dynamism of grace 
because the incorporation of a global perspective in end-of-life dis-
cernment invites a new openness to all the possibilities of grace at the 
end of life. 
At the moment, as explained above, the common interpretation of 
grace at the end of life is limited. Despite the fact that the principle of 
ordinary and extraordinary means points to grace at both of its poles, 
the application of this principle has led to the assumption that the 
proper place to search for grace is with the patient who insists on 
fighting to the end, despite any suffering, so that she or he can enjoy 
the grace of a purely “natural death.” In this model, there is little space 
for grace in the patient who chooses to forgo or to cease treatments 
that could prolong life but not change the inevitable. Such a person 
seems to be giving up at precisely the moment he or she is called to be 
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ramping up for battle instead. Yet surely grace is not so restrictive. 
The very gratuity of grace suggests that God’s love cannot be confined 
in advance. Fortunately, the introduction of a global perspective pro-
vides a theological explanation of the ways that grace can be operative 
not only in the choice to battle for one’s life but also in the decision to 
accept one’s finitude in a way that springs from a concern for others. 
Here a Rahnerian notion of grace is especially informative, for Karl 
Rahner described grace as God’s self-communication, or agapic gift 
of self, to the world.46 Hence, he identified the experience of grace as 
self-transcendence, specifically the form of transcendence that allows 
one to move beyond self-concern to a selfless concern for others.47 
Insofar as a patient chooses, after an appropriately careful discernment 
process, to forgo what they discern to be a locally ordinary but glob-
ally extraordinary treatment out of a selfless concern for others’ ability 
to access care—especially a selfless concern for the poor’s ability to 
access care—then that patient is necessarily a recipient and a conduit 
of grace in the world, for there is in Rahnerian terms no other expla-
nation for this agapic gift of self than the gift of God’s very essence, 
agape, grace. If Catholic health care ethics has no way to countenance 
this decision, then Catholics might very well be led astray in their 
search for grace at the end of life. 
To be clear, no part of this defense of a twofold approach to ordi-
nary and extraordinary means is meant to suggest that every person 
should use this perspective to forgo any and all end of life treatments. 
The point, instead, is to carve out room for Catholic ethics to 
acknowledge more explicitly that a Catholic in good conscience could 
take this route, at least under certain circumstances. With its greater 
flexibility for consciences, the twofold discernment process outlined 
here allows the principle of ordinary and extraordinary means to ac-
count better for the pitfalls of this present, imperfect world and also to 
acknowledge more readily the multifaceted nature of grace’s forays 
into that same present, imperfect world.  
This approach will not, however, solve everything. In fact, the in-
troduction of a global perspective is much more of a bandage than a 
cure. The end goal must be to expand access to care so that there would 
be less need for a twofold discernment process because the burdens of 
receiving the same treatment will be distributed less unevenly across 
the globe. A process of double discernment serves this goal by raising 
awareness about the problem and by reminding people of the ways 
that their seemingly private decisions always have social ramifications 
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in a world of finite resources. Still, individual recognition of this in-
terconnectedness will not suddenly fix the unjust distribution of health 
care goods. Real change will only come as a result of reforms in the 
social, political, and economic structures that constrain choices and 
perpetuate injustices—that is, through transformation of the structures 
of sin underlying the global health care system today.48  
Such structural changes are, however, impossible to imagine with-
out a committed group of personal moral agents whose consciences 
are attuned to the magnitude of the problem at hand. Hence, the global 
approach to end-of-life care defended here might best be described as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rectification of the 
global injustices in access to health care. Significantly, even this small 
step in the right direction will be difficult to achieve because there are 
other structural pressures that militate against even a limited consci-
entization like this. Additional changes will surely be necessary before 
more people can make the globally-conscious discernment of ordinary 
and extraordinary means envisioned here. By way of conclusion, then, 
this paper closes with a brief discussion of two of the changes that 
might set the stage for a better embrace of the global approach to or-
dinary and extraordinary means. 
 
MAKING GLOBAL EVALUATION A REALITY 
Certainly, there are obstacles that stand in the way of greater global 
awareness in health care, especially in the United States. There are 
many forms of moral inertia, both personal and institutional, that are 
already working to frustrate this more nuanced form of moral discern-
ment. Among the many examples one might imagine, two are promi-
nent enough to merit attention as a fitting conclusion to the argument 
for the global approach to end-of-life care. 
The first illustration of the inertia standing in the way of a global 
approach to ordinary and extraordinary means is personal. People have 
been primed to view health care as an eminently personal choice, and 
they are encouraged to make their health care decisions with their own 
self-interest in mind. People want the best care possible for them-
selves, and they will positively insist upon it for their family members 
(especially if those family members are minors). This is a natural in-
stinct, and morally speaking it is also a healthy one, for it respects the 
Thomistic ordering of charity, which acknowledges responsibilities 
for one’s own well-being (ST II-II, q. 26, a. 4) and also delineates var-
ying degrees of obligation to one’s neighbor according to familial 
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bonds, among other things (ST II-II, q. 26, a. 7–8).49 Furthermore, 
there are virtuous interpretations of this instinct, especially when one 
thinks of James Keenan’s relational account of the cardinal virtues, 
which promotes both self-care and fidelity as good dispositions for the 
moral life.50 Nevertheless, this instinct must not become absolute. 
Christianity has, for millennia, used the words and example of Jesus 
to criticize an exclusive prioritization of kin responsibilities, insisting 
instead that the sphere of moral responsibility cannot be limited to ties 
of blood alone.51 Keenan’s system of virtues, meanwhile, notes that 
the obligations of self-care and fidelity have to be weighed, with the 
assistance of prudence, against the demands of justice.52 Unfortu-
nately, as the struggle to incorporate both of these insights into ordi-
nary moral discernment illustrates, there is a considerable gap between 
admitting this moral responsibility and actually living it out in prac-
tice. Before a global approach to ordinary and extraordinary means 
can hope to have any impact, it will need to address this gap. 
The best way to challenge the gap, and thereby to make the global 
perspective more influential in ethical discernment at the end of life, 
is to promote the cultivation of solidarity throughout the entirety of 
one’s life. As both the descriptive fact of human interconnectedness 
and the spirit of moral obligation that flows from that fact, solidarity 
has the potential to impact ethical discernment in a profound and en-
compassing way.53 As Pope Francis explained, solidarity “refers to 
something more than a few sporadic acts of generosity. It presumes 
the creation of a new mindset which thinks in terms of community and 
the priority of the life of all over the appropriation of goods by a few” 
(Evangelii Gaudium, no. 187). In an individualistic society like the 
United States, though, this is far from a natural instinct.54 Conse-
quently, if the ultimate aim is to have more Catholics engaging in the 
twofold discernment process proposed here as an act of solidarity then 
Catholics first need to be encouraged to practice solidarity in more 
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routine matters of ethical discernment.  Then, they will be prepared to 
use solidarity as a central guiding feature in their major ethical deci-
sions, like the discernment of ordinary and extraordinary forms of end-
of-life care. 
To give just a few examples of how this cultivation of an everyday 
form of solidarity might occur, a parish could organize a talk on Laud-
ato Si’ and then hand out shower timers at the end as a way of prompt-
ing the faithful to recognize that water is a finite resource in the world, 
even if it is not in their local community. People could be encouraged 
to put their phones away during their free time so that they might build 
relationships rather than feed into the isolating tendencies of an in-
creasingly technology-saturated culture.55 This could occur by cham-
pioning public goods, like city parks, over private ones, like country 
clubs, so that people might build connections to their community as a 
whole and not just to individual friends in isolation.56  
These examples, though, are merely the beginning. The message 
needs to be that the work of solidarity never ends, and, therefore, that 
every ethical choice should be made with an awareness of its impact 
on others. In this way, the local church can work to ensure that the 
valorization of individualism and personal autonomy might not hold 
the same sway on the faithful Catholic that it holds on people in the 
United States more generally. Given the force of individualism as a 
cultural value, the everyday development of solidarity is the only way 
that Catholics in the United States can be expected to see the global 
perspective on ordinary and extraordinary means as a genuine invita-
tion to explore the role of grace in their lives and not as an external 
imposition encroaching on their individual rights. 
In the absence of this development, a global consciousness will be 
an unrealistic ideal, especially for the majority of U.S. Catholics. The 
appropriate pastoral response, then, would not be to give up on the 
twofold process of discernment entirely but rather to underscore the 
importance of evaluating community burdens in the assessment of or-
dinary and extraordinary means and to encourage patients to think of 
their social responsibilities in progressively larger senses. This might 
allow them to imagine how the burdens of their treatment would look 
different if they were in a less well-connected area of the United States 
or if they had fewer economic resources but were in the same location. 
In this way, the twofold discernment process could still promote a 
sense of solidarity with those in need, and it could still call attention 
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56 The dangers of the opposite trend are alluded to in Ward and Himes, “‘Growing 
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to health care disparities in those instances where a global accounta-
bility represents too ambitious a goal. Of course, this concern reflects 
the need to inculcate solidarity as a more regular part of the moral life 
through the kinds of practices just detailed, but, in the interim, making 
this kind of accommodation is perfectly reasonable given that so much 
remains to be done to promote solidarity more effectively. 
Beyond the narrow sense of autonomy that necessitates greater 
training in solidarity, there is also a second, institutional form of iner-
tia standing in the way of a more globally-conscious approach to end-
of-life care, this one lodged in the structures of Catholic health care 
itself. This is quite significant because, as a key provider of care, es-
pecially long-term care, Catholic health care creates a key institutional 
context within which many of the end-of-life decisions envisioned 
here occur.  Yet Catholic health care is not always structured to pro-
mote a twofold discernment process that examines both local and 
global realities. Consider again the case of a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state who has chosen, after the twofold discernment process 
outlined above, to issue an advance directive requesting the discontin-
uation of artificial nutrition and hydration after this diagnosis has be-
come effectively irreversible. Unfortunately, the structures of a Cath-
olic hospital could end up preventing a patient’s care team from hon-
oring precisely this kind of request, for at least two reasons. 
First, although health care teams are committed to honoring the au-
tonomy of their patients, a certain kind of institutional inertia can com-
plicate the decision-making process, especially with incapacitated pa-
tients, like those in a persistent vegetative state. For a variety of rea-
sons, including fear of litigation, health care teams often cede power 
to surrogates in these situations, but the surrogate decision-maker is 
not always held accountable to the patient’s wishes, even when those 
wishes have been expressed in an advance directive. As a result, phy-
sicians have observed that advance directives “have been disappoint-
ingly ineffective…because of barriers that are conceptual (general re-
luctance to explore death and dying), structural (inadequate clinical 
training, etc.) and procedural (restrictions on who can serve as a health 
care agent or proxy).”57 Some of this can be addressed by encouraging 
patients to develop advanced planning for end-of-life decisions in a 
process that emphasizes more than just advance directives, but a com-
plete solution must attend to the fact that there is “an organizational 
and professional failure to empower clinicians to support the patient’s 
documented moral discernment” even in Catholic hospitals.58 
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Second, another structural issue stems from a combination of the 
ERDs’ approach to advance directives and the developing tradition on 
artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in a persistent vegetative 
state. Directive 24 indicates that a Catholic health care institution “will 
not honor an advance directive that is contrary to Catholic teaching.” 
Similarly, Directive 59 proclaims, “The free and informed judgment 
made by a competent adult patient [and by extension a legally desig-
nated proxy] concerning the use or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures should always be respected and morally complied with, unless 
it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching.” When this guidance is cou-
pled with John Paul II’s papal allocution and the CDF’s clarification 
of that speech, the result is an ambiguity surrounding advance direc-
tives requesting the cessation of artificial nutrition and hydration when 
one is diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state.59 In fact, when the 
United States bishops revised Directive 58 in 2009 to account for the 
magisterial developments concerning patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, Ron Hamel and Thomas Nairn provided guidance about the 
revisions for people working in Catholic health care ministry and ex-
plicitly acknowledged that “there may be the occasional situation, 
such as some patients in a persistent vegetative state, when what the 
patient is requesting through his or her advance directive is not con-
sistent with the moral teachings of the Church. In these few cases, the 
Catholic health care facility would not be able to comply.”60 Now, in 
practice, Catholic health care facilities are not routinely intervening to 
object to a patient’s advance directives, even in cases like this, out of 
a respect for the consciences and discernment processes of patients 
and their families. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the language of 
the ERDs at least creates an ambiguity on this matter, meaning that if 
the proverbial winds were to change, the structures would be in place 
to undermine a patient who employed the twofold discernment process 
in this situation. Consequently, it would be helpful to clarify this issue 
so that patients might, in good conscience, accept their invitation to 
cooperate with grace at the end of life in the way that befits their situ-
ation before God. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The two obstacles just described illustrate that getting the faithful 
to adopt a twofold discernment process for end-of-life care will likely 
be an uphill battle, especially in the United States. The Catholic com-
munity ought to commit itself to this battle, however, because so much 
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is at stake. The twofold process of discerning ordinary and extraordi-
nary means in both a local and a global context has a real potential to 
combat some of the most dangerous tendencies of the recent balloon-
ing of ordinary means. Moreover, this approach reflects the best of the 
Catholic Church’s long commitment to a transformative concern for 
the poor, and it suggests a way that Catholic health care ethics might 
embrace Pope Francis’s vision for a “Church which is poor and for the 
poor.”61 Just as importantly, a twofold discernment process promotes 
a greater openness to grace, counteracting the recent tendency to 
preemptively restrict grace at the end of life. The road to making this 
global approach to end-of-life care a reality may be challenging, and 
it may be fraught with the frictions of sin both personal and structural, 
but insofar as this approach springs from the conviction that grace is 
at work in the world, it has every reason to hope that grace will be 
provided for all the steps along the way.  
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